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CAN NEGLIGENT REPRESENTATION BE FAIR
REPRESENTATION? AN ALTERNATIVE
APPROACH TO GROSS NEGLIGENCE
ANALYSIS
Neglgentprocessing of an employee's grievance by his or her union is apersistent
analyticalprobiem under the duty offair representation owed by a union to its mem-
bers. The General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board suggested in a
recent memorandum that a breach of that duty occurs in instances ofgross (as op-
posed to mere) negigence, as well as in other dqfned circumstances. This Note dis-
cusses the development of the duty of fair representation, the guidelines in the
General Counsel's memorandum, and problems attendant to a distinction between
mere and gross negigence. The author suggests that a distinction based on discre-
tionary andproceduralfunctions be substituted/or the analysir under dfering de-
grees of neg'gence arguing that anposing a greater duty of care upon unions in their
procedural handling of grievances would yield a sounde, fairer, and morepredict-
able operation of the duty ffair representation.
INTRODUCTION
SECTION 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)'
gives a properly designated union2 the status of exclusive repre-
sentative for purposes of collective bargaining.3 The section does
not, however, provide for a similar degree of union control over
grievance procedures.4 Nonetheless, most labor contracts do, in
fact, provide for union exclusivity in processing employee griev-
ances.' Inherent in this dual exclusivity is increased union power
1. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
2. Generally, a union is properly designated when a majority of employees in a bar-
gaining unit have indicated that they want the union to represent them. 1d § 9(c)(i), 29
U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976).
3. Section 9(a) provides in part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be
the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment.
Id § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
4. The applicable proviso of section 9(a) provides:
That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted,
without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjust-
ment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or
agreement then in effect: Providedfurther, That the bargaining representative has
been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
Id § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
5. Lehmann, The Union's Duty ofFair Representation-Steele and Its Successors, 30
FED. BJ. 280, 282 n.15 (1971).
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and an increased potential for abuse.' Thus, to protect employee
interests from this potentiality, the judiciary developed the duty of
fair representation.' The scope of this duty has never been clear,
consequently, the issue of fair representation has posed difficult
problems for both the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)8
and the courts.9
On July 9, 1979, John Irving, as General Counsel of the
NLRB, attempted to clarify the scope of the obligation in a mem-
orandum directed to all Regional Offices.'0 Outlining substantive
guidelines for the issuance of a complaint, Irving specified four
general categories of union conduct which would constitute a
breach of the duty of fair representation: improper motives or
fraud, arbitrary conduct, gross negligence, and certain union con-
duct after it has begun to grieve on behalf of an employee."
Notably, Irving stated explicitly that a union's mere negligence
has never, and would never, be a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation.12 He suggested, however, that "negligence [which] was
so gross as to constitute a reckless disregard of the interests of the
unit employee" may be a breach of the duty, but only under ex-
ceptional circumstances.' 3 To ensure that negligence would serve
as a basis for a breach only in such unusual cases, Irving directed
Regional Directors to submit possible cases of gross negligence to
the Division of Advice for a determination of merit.' 4
Since this memorandum is a message to the courts as well as to
6. See Cox, The Duty ofFair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151, 152 (1957).
7. One commentator has described the evolution of the duty of fair representation as
"an attempt to protect the interests of individual employees without, at the same time,
vitiating the effectiveness of collective bargaining." T. BoYcE, FAIR REPRESENTATION,
THE NLRB, AND THE COURTs 4 (1978).
8. Fanning, The Duty ofFair Representation, 19 B.C.L. REv. 813, 837 (1978).
9. See Leffler, Piercing the Duty o/Fair Representation: The Dichotomy Between Ne-
gotiations and Grievance Handling, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 35, 36-37.
10. Section 8(b)(1)(A) Cases Involving a Union's Duty ofFair Representation, 101 LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) 224 (Gen. Counsel Memo, 79-55, July 9, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Union's Duty o/Fair Representation].
John Irving resigned on Oct. 20, 1979, and Norton Come was appointed acting General
Counsel. Telephone interview with the Information Division of the NLRB (Feb. 23, 1980).
William A. Lubbers was sworn in as General Counsel on January 2, 1980 and was con-
firmed by the Senate on April 23, 1980. Telephone interview with the Information Divi-
sion of the NLRB (June 3, 1980).
11. Union's Duty afFair Representation, supra note 10, at 226-27.
12. Id at 227.
13. Id
14. Id Edward B. Miller, Former Chairman of the NLRB, described the attitude of
regional personnel toward review by the Division of Advice as "ivory tower in nature,
made by professionals too far removed from the people and real life situations faced daily
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the Regional Offices, 15 a distinction between gross and mere negli-
gence without a defined difference may pose problems for dis-
charged employees claiming union negligence as the basis for an
unfair representation charge. It may cause such claimants to be
turned away from the Regional Offices and force them to seek
relief from the courts.16 If the distinction is maintained by the
courts as well, it may prove fatal to arguably meritorious claims
against employers, thus promoting unfairness to employees for the
sake of an otherwise unnecessary rule of judicial convenience. 7
On the other hand, if the distinction between gross and mere neg-
ligence is not maintained by the courts, there is a risk that conflict-
ing.rulings by the Regional Offices and the courts will encourage
more claimants to emerge, 8 further burdening the limited re-
sources of each.19
This Note examines the scope of a union's duty of fair repre-
sentation. First, it traces the development of the duty to show its
continuous expansion in an effort to remain consistent with em-
ployee expectations while not unduly infringing upon union dis-
cretion.2" Next, the Note discusses the standards for a breach of
the duty developed by John Irving and describes the meaning of
the four types of conduct specified in his memorandum.2
by the regional offices." E. MILLER, AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPRAISAL OF THE NLRB 37
(rev. ed. 1978).
15. Irving intended to furnish guidance to all "interested parties" through his memo-
randum. Union's Duty of Fair Representation, supra note 10, at 227.
16. Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976), as
interpreted by Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), permits an individual
employee to bring suit against his or her employer for breach of the collective bargaining
agreement. Id at 200. Since an employer may assert nonexhaustion of contractual reme-
dies as a defense in such a case, the action will be dismissed unless the employee can prove
either that the conduct of the employer amounts to a repudiation of the grievance proce-
dure or that the union has breached its duty of fair representation. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 185 (1967).
17. See notes 130-41 infra and accompanying text.
18. In a speech presented to the American Bar Association National Institute on April
27, 1979, Irving noted.
IT]he courts have articulated varying standards for what constitutes a denial of
fair representation, and the Board uses other standards in determining whether an
unfair labor practice has occurred....
What results is uncertainty about the law, which is harmful to the national
labor policy. Thus, we get more individually filed charges each year.
Speech by John Irving concerning the Duty of Fair Representation, 101 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 228, 228 (Gen. Counsel Memo. 79-56, July 9, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Irving
speech].
19. See Union's Duty of Fair Representation, supra note 10, at 225.
20. See notes 29-64 infra and accompanying text.
21. See notes 67-107 infra and accompanying text.
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In particular, the Note focuses on whether a union's negli-
gence may constitute a breach of its duty of fair representation. 2
The Note analyzes the Irving approach-that only gross union
negligence could constitute a breach-and finds that not only is
this approach impracticable because of a lack of adequate doctri-
nal foundations, 3 but it is also unfair to an employee as it may
result in precluding otherwise meritorious claims, contrary to em-
ployee expectations.2 4 In addition, the Note argues that even if
this new NLRB standard is rejected by the courts, the result will
be an undesirable overloading of judicial resources as claimants,
deprived of administrative redress, clamor for access to the
courts.2 5
Finally, this Note advances a solution to the problems
presented by Irving's approach to union negligence as a breach of
the duty of fair representation. Rather than maintaining an artifi-
cial distinction between gross negligence (for which a union would
be liable) and mere negligence (for which a union would not be
liable) for all union activities, this Note proposes that union activi-
ties be divided into "procedural" and "substantive" activities, with
a greater duty of care imposed with regard to the for-
mer-consistent with employee expectations. 26 Such an ap-
proach, this Note argues, not only avoids the problems raised by
the gross negligence-mere negligence distinction, but also finds
considerable support in administrative law27 and the general stat-
utory framework in the area of labor relations.28
I. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION
The American labor movement emerged in response to em-
ployer domination of the work environment to give individual
employees a collective voice in determining their conditions of
employment.2 9 Subsequently, the duty of fair representation was
22. See notes 91-151 infra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 115-25 infra and accompanying text.
24. See notes 126-41 infra and accompanying text.
25. See notes 142-51 infra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 152-65 infra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 181-91 infra and accompanying text.
28. See notes 167-80 infra and accompanying text.
29. T. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 3. See also Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in
Labor Relations, 68 HARP. L. REV. 999, 1003 (1955).
The labor movement has also been described in more dramatic terms: "Broadly con-
ceived the labor movement is the progress of the masses of the people up from slavery,
[Vol. 30:537
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judicially developed to protect that coveted voice from possible
abuse by powerful unions whose institutional interests often
clashed with the interests of individual members.3"
An example of such a conflict occurred in Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad,3 the seminal case in the development of the
duty of fair representation. The union in Steele had negotiated a
seniority agreement which gave preference to white firemen for
promotion and layoff and which would have ultimately excluded
black firemen from employment with the railroad.32 Invalidating
the contract, the Supreme Court analogized a union to a legisla-
ture and found that the union was "subject to constitutional limi-
tations on its power to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate
against the rights of those for whom it legislates and. . . under an
affirmative constitutional duty equally to protect those rights."33
Yet, the Court decided the case on a slightly narrower basis, hold-
ing that the representational exclusivity of the union, as conferred
upon it by the Railway Labor Act,34 demanded that the union
fairly represent all interests of those affected "without hostile dis-
crimination.
35
The applicability of the duty of fair representation to contract
their escape through serfdom into the wage system, and their ever continuing struggle to
improve their economic and social condition." J. ANDREWS, LABOR PROBLEMS AND LA-
BOR LEGISLATION 5 (4th ed. 1932).
30. T. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 4.
31. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
32. Id at 195.
33. Id at 198. This analogy was rebutted in Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Repre-
sentation, and the Interests ofIndividual Workers: Should Exclusivity BeAbolished?, 123 U.
PA. L. REv. 897, 901-02 (1975). Schatzki conceded that both a union and a legislature are
selected by a majority and that both participate in the creation of laws which will affect
many, including those who did not vote for the union or the legislator. However, he saw at
least three significant differences between the two institutions. First, the union does not
unilaterally decide the contents of the labor contract because it must bargain with the em-
ployer, the legislature is not under the same constraint. Id at 901. Second, a union, unlike
a legislature, often deals with issues of intense and direct interest to all of its members. Id
at 902. Third, unions commonly represent all employees in their individual grievances
against one another and the employer, whereas the legislature does not represent individ-
ual concerns or grievances. Id
34. 45 U.S.C. § 152 4 (1976).
35. 323 U.S. at 202-03. A union is, in fact, presumed to act on behalf of a majority of
the persons whom it represents. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1944).
This presumption is supported by two theories-that the employees can pressure the union
to act in their best interests because of their ability to remove its officers or to commence
decertification proceedings, and that the union's goal is to satisfy the majority of the bar-
gaining unit which it represents. Note, The Duty of Fair Representation and Exclusive Rep-
resentation in Grievance Administration: The Duty of Fair Representation, 27 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1199, 1202 (1976).
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negotiation was extended in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman36 to in-
clude cases and disputes arising under the NLRA.37 The Court
not only read Steele to require honest efforts to serve all union
members without hostility, but also declared that a union must be
accorded "a wide range of reasonableness ... subject always to
complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its
discretion. 38
The union's duty was extended further four years later when
the duty was applied to cases involving the administration of a
contract. In Conley v. Gibson,39 the Supreme Court explicitly
stated that the union's duty to represent its members fairly "does
not come to an abrupt end. . . with the making of an agreement
between union and employer."'  Rather, the Court declared:
Collective bargaining is a continuing process. Among other
things, it involves day-to-day adjustments in the contract and
other working rules, resolution of new problems not covered by
existing agreements, and the protection of employee rights al-
ready secured by contract. The bargaining representative can
no more unfairly discriminate in carrying out these functions
than it can in negotiating a collective agreement.4 '
Notwithstanding this extension of the duty to cases of contract
administration, the duty has generally been thought to be more
flexible in the negotiation context.42 This variation is due to the
amount of discretion which the union needs (and is afforded) in
each situation to function effectively. 43 For example, in negotiat-
36. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
37. Id at 337-38. For a discussion of the similarities between fair representation suits
under the Railway Labor Act and the NLRA, see Feller, .4 General Theory ofthe Collective
Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663, 667-718 (1973).
38. 345 U.S. at 338.
39. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
40. Id at 46.
41. Id
42. See, e.g., T. BoYcE, supra note 7, at 29 ("[A] union's discretion in contract admin-
istration [is] narrower, and its burden correspondingly greater, than the discretion accorded
it in negotiating."); Leffler, supra note 9, at 37 ("[T]he Court unwittingly, but properly,
developed different standards of fair representation corresponding with the different roles
played by the union as exclusive representative of unit employees."); Summers, The Indi-
vidual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Represen-
tation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 254-58 (1977) ("The standards are not the same, because
the statutory policy, the status of the union, and the practical needs of collective bargaining
are quite different in contract administration."). Contra, Blumrosen, The Worker and
Three Phases of Unionism Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Rela-
tionsho, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1435, 1475-76 (1963) (where the author notes that the distinc-
tion between problems of negotiation and problems of administration are artificial).
43. T. BoYcE, supra note 7, at 29; Summers, supra note 42, at 254-58. The variation is
also due, in part, to the congressional line-drawing in the statute, Ze., the distinction implic-
542 [Vol. 30:537
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ing a contract, the union must compromise not only with the em-
ployer, but also with various interest groups within the union.'
This precarious position necessitates wider union discretion,45
which can be freely given without damaging any specific em-
ployee expectations.46 Once an agreement is reached, however,
employee expectations become firmly rooted in the contract, and
correspondingly the discretion afforded the union in administer-
ing the contract is limited.47
Consistent with the need to extend the duty to meet employee
expectations, yet not to interfere with union discretionary activi-
ties, the Court has defined the duty in broad terms. In one of its
most explicit statements on the duty of fair representation, the
Supreme Court in Vaca v. Sopes4 s declared that a breach of the
duty of fair representation occurs "only when a union's conduct
toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith."49 Despite this clear statement,
itly made in section 9 between negotiation and contract administration. See notes 1-5
supra and accompanying text.
44. Summers, supra note 42, at 257.
45. Id
46. T. BoYcE, supra note 7, at 29.
47. Id
48. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
49. Id at 190. Although the narrow issue in Vaca was the propriety of a union deci-
sion not to arbitrate the plaintiff-employee's grievance, id at 173, the Court chose this
occasion to clarify the duty of fair representation. The Vaca standard of "arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, or in bad faith" only reformulated (although in a more concise way) pre-
existing law. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944)
("[The bargaining representative ... [has a] duty to exercise fairly the power conferred
upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against
them."); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) ("A wide range of reasona-
bleness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it repre-
sents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its
discretion."); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 350 (1964) (The union is not liable if it
"took its position honestly, in good faith and without hostility or arbitrary discrimina-
tion.").
Justice White, writing for the majority, covered other major issues as well. First, be
concluded that the preemption doctrine was inapplicable to controversies involving the
duty of fair representation; thus, courts had concurrent jurisdiction with the NLRB. 386
U.S. at 183. Second, the Court expressly rejected the position that every employee has the
right to have his or her grievance taken to arbitration. Id at 191. Finally, the Court ad-
dressed the requirement that an employee must exhaust his or her contractual remedies
before seeking judicial relief. Justice White found that a discharged employee would be
relieved of this requirement if the employer's conduct "amounts to a repudiation of those
contractual procedures" or if "the union has sole power under the contract to invoke the
higher stages of the grievance procedure, and if... the employee-plaintiff has been pre-
vented from exhausting his contractual remedies by the union's wrongfulrefusal to process
the grievance." Id. at 185 (emphasis in original). Thus, if an employee can prove unfair
1980]
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courts have not uniformly applied this tripartite standard. Some
jurisdictions have required a showing of union'ill-will, hostility, or
bad faith before finding a breach.50 Moreover, the Supreme Court
itself seemed to deviate from the Vaca standard in Amalgamated
Association of Street Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees
v. Lockridge 1 In Lockridge, the Court announced that "a dis-
tinction. . . between honest, mistaken conduct, on the one hand,
and deliberate and severely hostile and irrational treatment, on
the other, needs strictly to be maintained"52 when judging a
union's conduct. However, commentators have dismissed the im-
portance of Lockridge by suggesting that the Court was attempt-
ing (although erroneously) only to describe pre-existing law,53 that
the Court's references to the duty were merely dicta,54 or that it
has been overshadowed by a subsequent Court statement on the
matter.55 Thus, notwithstanding Lockridge, Vaca remains the
Court's definitive statement on the duty of fair representation.56
Yet, even with a "clear" general definition of what the duty is
or when it has been breached, critical issues of interpretation re-
main. Perhaps the most important issue arises when the Vaca
representation, the employer's defense of nonexhaustion of contractual remedies fails.
50. E.g., Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 952 (1971) (A "finding of hostility, malice, or bad faith" is required.); Hiatt v. New
York Cent. R.R., 444 F.2d 1397, 1398 (7th Cir. 1971) ("[A]ppellants are required to demon-
strate that their exclusion was based in bad faith arbitrariness."); Jackson v. TWA, Inc., 457
F.2d 202, 204 (2d Cir. 1972) (Hostile discrimination is necessary to establish a breach of the
duty of fair representation.). See also Comment, Post-Vaca Standards of the Union's Duty
of Fair Representation." Consolidating Bargaining Units, 19 VILL. L. REV. 885 (1974). Con-
tra Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972) ("The repeated references in Vaca to
'arbitrary' union conduct reflected a calculated broadening of the fair representation stan-
dard. . . . [A] union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or handle it in a
perfunctory manner."); Retana v. Apartment Operators Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1023 (9th
Cir. 1972) (A union must avoid arbitrary conduct.); DeArroyo v. Sindicato de
Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 284 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970)
("[A]rbitrary and perfunctory handling by a union of an apparently meritorious grievance
is not acceptable under the standard of fair representation.").
51. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
52. Id at 301.
53. Clark, The Duty ofFair Representation. A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEx. L. REV.
1119, 1125 (1973).
54. 10 SUFFOLK L. REV. 642, 646 (1976).
55. See T. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 38. In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424
U.S. 554, 568-69 (1976), the Court cited Vaca approvingly and never mentioned
Lockridge. In a later case, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47
(1979), the Court again cited the Vaca standard of "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
faith" with approval.
56. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 698 (1976).
[Vol. 30:537
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standard is applied to an alleged instance of union negligence.
While some lower courts have found unfair representation where
a union's conduct has been negligent, few of them have termed it
such.57 Most courts have followed the significant Sixth Circuit de-
cision of Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp.5" In Ruzicka, the court
found that the union's failure to make a decision on the merits of
the discharged employee's grievance and its negligence in al-
lowing the deadline for filing a grievance to pass were arbitrary
and perfunctory acts which constituted a breach of the duty of fair
representation under Vaca.5 9 Judge McCree, in a concurring
opinion, preferred to find a breach solely on the basis of negli-
gence, without trying to pigeonhole the union's unintentional con-
duct as either "arbitrary" or "perfunctory."60
The NLRB initially exhibited a general reluctance to equate
negligent grievance processing with unfair representation,6' but
the Ruzicka decision has made inroads on that tendency. 2 For
example, in United Steelworkers,63 the Board, citing Ruzicka, con-
cluded that the union "breached [its] duty of fair representation
by the perfunctory and negligent manner in which [it] processed
the grievance [and] by allowing it to expire ... .64
57. E.g., Foust v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 572 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 42 (1979) (The union's failure to file a grievance in a
timely manner constituted "perfunctory conduct."); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523
F.2d 306 (6th Cir.), rehearing denied, 528 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1975); Pierce v. Fox Mfg. Co.,
97 L.R.R.M. 2321 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (The untimely filing of an appeal to arbitration was a
"breach of the duty of fair representation," and thus the arbitrator's denial of relief did not
bar a section 301 suit against the employer.); Ruggerello v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp.
758, 760 (E.D. Mich. 1976) ("If a union breaches its duty of fair representation in failing to
process a grievance before determining its merit, it is certainly liable for failing to initiate a
grievance after acknowledging its merit.").
58. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir.), rehearing denied, 528 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1975).
59. Id at 310. The Court in Vaca had expressly declared that "a union may not
arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a pe'functory fashion." Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191 (emphasis added).
60. Id at 315-16 (McCree, J., concurring). Cf. Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways
Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1973). In a concurring opinion, one member of the Robesky
court noted that "The court attempts to define the term 'arbitrary' by using tort concepts of
culpability. . . . Neither the law of torts nor precedents in the federal common law of
labor relations provide adequate guidance to define the term 'arbitrary' in this manner."
Id at 1092 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
61. See, e.g., Great Western Uni-Freight, 209 N.L.R.B. 446 (1974).
62. T. BoYcE, supra note 7, at 44-45.
63. 223 N.L.R.B. 1184 (1976).
64. Id at 1190. The NLRB has found a breach of the duty of fair representation in
the face of negligent union conduct in other cases as well, but it has been reluctant to attach
the negligence label. Eg., P & L Cedar Prod. Co., 224 N.L.R.B. 244 (1976); Western Ex-
terminator Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 1270 (1976).
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Apparently, both the judiciary and the NLRB have taken steps
(perhaps unknowingly) towards enlarging the scope of the duty of
fair representation to include liability for union negligence. The
Office of the General Counsel has been opposed to such a trend,
as demonstrated by John Irving's recent memorandum to all Re-
gional Offices.
II. THE MEMORANDUM OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
The General Counsel of the NLRB has been referred to as
"the keeper of the keys to the temple of justice."65 Not only does
the General Counsel possess the power to investigate charges, is-
sue complaints, and prosecute, but also, his decisions with regard
to these matters are not reviewable by either the courts or the
Board.66
Consistent with such powers, John Irving, as General Counsel,
determined the bases for the issuance of a complaint whenever a
charge of unfair representation is made.67 His guidelines with re-
gard to this particular charge are extremely important, as the issu-
ance of an unfair representation complaint is often determinative
of the matter.68 Moreover, Irving's findings on this issue are bind-
ing on the Regional Offices because of his general supervisory
control over all employees and officers therein.6 9
In attempting to clarify the scope of the duty of fair represen-
tation, Irving's express goal was to minimize the serious conse-
quences which flow from the "vagueness, imprecision, and sheer
number of word-tests" used to define the fair representation
obligation.7 ° The consequences of the confusion are not unim-
pressive: a union processes clearly nonmeritorious grievances to
avoid the appearance of breaching its duty, thus clogging arbitral
65. Statement of former Senator Sam Ervin, quotedin E. MILLER, supra note 14, at 36.
66. NLRA § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976). For a detailed history of the establish-
ment of the Office of the General Counsel, see International Union of Elec. Workers v.
NLRB, 289 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Notably, the Regional Directors' decisions are subject to review by the Board, which
has power to: 1) determine appropriate bargaining units; 2) investigate and provide for
hearings; 3) determine whether a question of representation exists; and 4) to hold represen-
tation elections. NLRA § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976).
67. See Union's Duty of Fair Representation, supra note 10, at 227.
68. Irving speech, supra note 18, at 230. Unions prefer to settle such claims--even
when their chances of winning before the Board are good--to avoid the expense of defend-
ing the charge. Id
69. NLRA § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976).
70. Union's Duty of Fair Representation, supra note 10, at 225.
546 [Vol. 30:537
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channels;7' the NLRB wastes its valuable and limited resources by
investigating normeritorious charges;7" both the union and the
employer are potentially liable for substantial monetary damages
(e.g., back pay) if a breach is proved;73 and a union may be unable
to recruit stewards and officers with the requisite competence if it
must assure an error-free grievance procedure.74
In his memorandum, Irving chose to categorize circumstances
which would constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation,
rather than to re-phrase the duty.75 He divided prohibited union
conduct into four categories: (1) improper motives or fraud, (2)
arbitrary conduct, (3) certain union conduct after it has begun to
grieve on an employee's behalf, and (4) gross negligence.76 Using
these categories as a guide, Irving's directives to the Regional Di-
rectors appear simple: if the union's conduct falls within one of
the categories, the Regional Office should issue a complaint;77 if
the union's conduct does not fall within one of the categories, the
Regional Office should dismiss the charge.7"
Still, despite the apparent simplicity, questions remain regard-
ing the definition of each of the described categories. The first
category describes union conduct attributable to improper
motives.79 In this regard, if the union action interferes with the
"section 7 activities" of employees,8" such action is a breach of the
71. Id at 224-25.
72. Id at 225. A breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice,
thus giving the Board jurisdiction over such charges. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181
(1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 179
(where the Court declared that the Board did not have exclusive jurisdiction over cases
involving the alleged violation of the union's duty of fair representation).
73. Union's Duty of Fair Representation, supra note 10, at 225. See note 16 supra for
an explanation of the mechanics of an employee suit against his or her employer and
union.
74. Union's Duty of Fair Representation, supra note 10, at 225. See Vladeck, The Con-
flict between the Duty of Fair Representation and the Limitations on Union Self-Government,
in THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 44 (J. McKelvey ed. 1977).
75. Union's Duty of Fair Representation, supra note 10, at 225.
76. Id at 226-27.
77. Id at 225.
78. Id
79. Id at 226. Fraud is within the ambit of the improper motives category. Proof of
fraud requires "evidence that the union intentionally misled the employee as to a material
fact concerning his/her [sic] employment, and that the employee reasonably relied thereon
to his/her [sic] detriment." Id
80. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) describes permissible employee labor activities
which are thus known as "section 7 activities." This section provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, to join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
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duty.8 ' Moreover, even if the section 7 rights of employees are
not involved, conduct attributable to improper motives is a breach
of the duty if based on "irrelevant or invidious considerations. 82
Notably, this category addresses a union's intentional conduct.
Under the second category, union conduct which is arbitrary is
also a breach of the duty of fair representation.83 Specifically, if
"there is no basis upon which the union's conduct can be ex-
plained," the action is arbitrary. 84 Refusal to process a grievance
after only a perfunctory inquiry, or no inquiry at all, is unfair rep-
resentation,85 as is the union's refusal to support an employee
without explanation if there is a "contract or an internal union
policy which clearly and unambiguously supports the employee's
position."'86
Another category of conduct which Irving considered is the
union's conduct after it has chosen to pursue a grievance on behalf
of an employee.87 In such a case, the union is not statutorily pre-
cluded from settling the grievance or acquiescing in the em-
ployer's position, provided that the union is not improperly
motivated or acting arbitrarily. 88 Also, when deciding whether to
pursue a grievance to arbitration, the union may consider the
monetary costs of such further processing.89 In sum, the union is
allowed a "wide range of reasonableness. . . in serving the unit it
represents . ... 90
Finally, and more importantly, Irving included a category of
behavior, which he termed "gross negligence," that would consti-
tute a breach of the fair representation duty.9' In delineating this
category, Irving explicitly stated that although a union's mere neg-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
Id
81. Union's Duty of Fair Representation, supra note 10, at 226.
82. Id
83. Id
84. Id
85. Id. "Inquiry" in this regard is defined in the negative: "[it] need not be the kind
of exhaustive inquiry that one would expect from a skilled investigator." Id
86. Id
87. Id at 227.
88. Id
89. Id
90. Id (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. at 338).
91. Id
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ligence is not the equivalent of unfair representation, 92 gross neg-
ligence may be a breach of the duty under exceptional
circumstances. 93 Since the proper circumstances are to be deter-
mined essentially by the Division of Advice, the actual standard to
be used to determine gross negligence remained virtually un-
stated.
There are, however, indications within the memorandum
which could give substance to the unstated standard. Although
noting that the General Counsel is not bound by judicial prece-
dent, Irving cited Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp.94 and Robesky
v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd 95 to support his position on gross
negligence. 96 Specifically, he read Robesky to define grossly negli-
gent conduct as "acts of omission by union officials not intended
to harm employees [but] so egregious, so far short of minimum
standards of fairness to the employee, or so unrelated to legitimate
union interests as to be unlawful.""7 By specifically noting
Robesky and its requirement of an egregious omission for gross
negligence, Irving seemingly adopted this as a necessary element
of the gross negligence category of the fair representation stan-
dards.
A second indication of the range of this category may be evi-
denced by Irving's statement that "the mere .fact that the union
is inept, negligent, unwise, insensitive, or ineffectual, will not,
standing alone, establish a breach of the duty." 98 This statement
not only reinforces the omission requirement, but it also refines
the description of what constitutes gross negligence, indicating
that a wide range of union activities, which would otherwise be
harmful to the employees, will not be considered a breach of the
duty.
Finally, a speech given by Irving to the American Bar Associa-
tion National Institute provides another guide for defining the un-
stated standard.99 In his explanation of the category of gross
92. Id at 227.
93. Id
94. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir.), rehearing denied, 528 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1975). See notes
58-64 supra and accompanying text.
95. 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978). See note 60 supra.
96. Union's Duty ofFair Representation, supra note 10, at 227.
97. Id Cf. Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d at 1090 ("Acts of omis-
sion by union officials not intended to harm members may be so egregious, so far short of
minimum standards of fairness to the employee and so unrelated to legitimate union inter-
ests as to be arbitrary.") (emphasis added).
98. Union'r Duty of Fair Representation, supra note 10, at 225 (footnotes omitted).
99. Irving speech, supra note 18.
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negligence Irving stated, "I think we should go slow here and wait
for a really egregious case before going to complaint on [union
negligence]."'' This statement indicates that findings of gross
negligence by the Division of Advice could indeed be rare.
That the categories of conduct constituting a breach of the
duty of fair representation-especially gross negligence-have
been narrowly defined by the General Counsel is not surprising.
Prior to Irving's memorandum, a record number of charges had
been filed against unions with the NLRB. 11 Each of the charges,
even if facially without merit, had to be investigated and analyzed
by a field attorney.102 The impact on the NLRB's resources is ob-
vious. 10 3 Consequently, the desire to reduce the number of non-
meritorious claims" 4 was undoubtedly a prominent motivation
behind the new standards. 1
0 5
In addition, in so defining his standards, Irving rejected a
stricter approach to union negligence in favor of a traditional,
moderate, and more practical standard.'0 6 By keeping the stan-
dard at a "moderate level," it remains acceptable to both labor
and management. A union need not worry about filing an un-
timely grievance or any other errors in detailed contract adminis-
tration, as long as the union was not improperly motivated, acting
arbitrarily or acting in such an egregiously erroneous fashion as to
constitute gross negligence. Employers benefit because they will
not be liable for the back pay of a discharged employee who
cannot prove more than mere negligence. 0 7 However, any bene-
100. Id at 230.
101. Most of these charges have been filed under NLRA § 8(b)(l), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(1) (1976), which provides in part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 157 [Section 7 of the NLRA, see note 80 supra] of this title."
Since 1968, the number of charges filed with the Board alleging violations under
§ 8(b)(1) has increased by 170%. Union's Duty of Fair Representation, supra note 10, at 225.
Irving estimated that over 800 unfair labor practice charges would be filed per week in
1980. Id
102. Union's Duty of Fair Representation, supra note 10, at 225.
103. Id
104. Irving speech, supra note 18, at 231.
105. See E. Miller, supra note 14, at 34-35 (where the former chairman of the NLRB
notes that efficiency is necessary to the effective functioning of the office of the General
Counsel).
106. Irving speech, supra note 18, at 229.
107. See, e.g., Dente v. International Organization of Masters, Local 90, 492 F.2d 10
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974). For a discussion of this case, see notes
137-41 infra and accompanying text.
550 [Vol. 30:537
NEGLIGENT REPRESENTATION
fits gained by this approach to fair representation may be out-
weighed by the problems it presents.
III. PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE
STANDARD
Irving's memorandum stands as the official statement from the
Office of the General Counsel on union negligence. It exists for
the use of the Regional Offices in the exercise of their duties, but it
was written also to furnish guidance to "interested parties" and
the public at large.108 Unofficially, it is a message to unions, em-
ployers, employees, and the courts.
The courts share jurisdiction with the Board over unfair repre-
sentation cases but are not bound by Board precedents or General
Counsel pronouncements in this area.'0 9 If a court chooses to fol-
low the guidelines on negligence set forth in the memorandum, it
will be faced with the problem of making a fine distinction be-
tween "gross" and "mere" negligence-words with no generally
accepted meaning. ° Further, it may be faced with a plaintiff
who was discharged for a wrongful reason, and be unable to af-
ford him or her relief because the union was merely negligent in
processing the grievance."' On the other hand, if the memoran-
dum's guidelines are not followed, the emergence of conflicting
rules from the NLRB and the courts may cause more claimants to
file charges and complaints." 2 There is an additional risk that
more complaints may be filed with the courts than with the NLRB
if claimants perceive a forum more hospitable to their negligence
theory." 3 In either case, more claimants will strain the resources
of the NLRB and the-courts."'
4
A. Adherence to the Guidelines
The initial problem posed by Irving's negligence formulation
is the continued use of the distinction between gross and mere
negligence without workable definitions. The prevailing view in
tort law as to degrees of negligence is that there are no degrees of
108. Union's Duty of Fair Representation, supra note 10, at 227.
109. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 180-83.
110. See notes 115-25 infra and accompanying text.
111. See notes 126-41 infra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 142-47 infra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 149-50 infra and accompanying text.
114. See notes 145 & 150 infra and accompanying text.
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care as a matter of law but only as a matter of fact.' 15 In other
words, gross negligence is ordinary negligence "with the addition
of a vituperative epithet.""I6 Dean Prosser has suggested that the
words gross negligence "signifly] more than ordinary inadvertence
or inattention, but less than conscious indifference to conse-
quences .. ,, . Prosser's observation parallels Irving's view of
the standard for gross negligence articulated in Robesky v. Qantas
Empire Airways Ltd:118 "acts of omission by union officials not
intended to harm employees [but] so egregious, so far short of
minimum standards of fairness to the employee, or so unrelated to
legitimate union interests as to be unlawful."" 19
Yet, any similarity between Irving's capsulization of Robesky
and Prosser's description of gross negligence does not simplify the
use of the gross negligence-mere negligence distinction. For ex-
ample, some commentators have observed that the use of a negli-
gence theory in an unfair representation case reduces the issue to
semantics. 20 Viewing the same set of facts, one court may term
the conduct "negligent" and deny relief, while another may deem
the actions to be "arbitrary" and permit the claimant to pursue the
suit.' 2 1 This is not unexpected in light of the fact that the negli-
gence-gross negligence distinction is not self-explanatory 122 and
that there is no sound analytical or precedential framework in
which to place the concept of union negligence. 23 Other com-
mentators have derided the use of negligence analysis in this con-
text as a "kiss of death" for plaintiffs' claims, 124 since any
discussion of negligence without the unusual circumstance of
egregious action will preclude the claimant from any relief. This
result is also not surprising, especially in light of such compelling
policy considerations as the desirability of preserving the private
115. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 182 (4th ed. 1971). For an outline of the histori-
cal development of gross negligence, see Note, An Analysis of Gross Negligence, 37 MARQ.
L. REV. 334, 335-38 (1953-54).
116. W. PROSSER, supra note 115, at 182 (quoting Baron Rolfe in Wilson v. Brett, 152
Eng. Rep. 737 (1843)).
117. Id at 184.
118. 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978). See notes 95-97 supra and accompanying text.
119. Union's Duty of Fair Representation, supra note 10, at 227. The court in Robesky
labeled this conduct arbitrary, not unlawful. See note 97 supra.
120. T. BoYcE, supra note 7, at 45.
121. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
122. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
123. See notes 115-17 supra and accompanying text.
124. Note, Duty of Fair Representation-Imposing Liability for Arbitrary Union Negli-
gence, 7 MEM. ST. L. REV. 168, 175 (1976).
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settlement process between the union and the employer and the
need to give the union discretion in both bargaining and grievance
activities. 25
The second problem posed by Irving's moderate approach to
fair representation is that discharged employees with meritorious
claims against their employers may be left remediless if their
union has been merely negligent. This problem becomes espe-
cially significant when employment is viewed as more than merely
"having a job":
Every man's employment is of utmost importance to him. It
occupies his time, his talents, and his thoughts. It controls his
economic destiny. It is the means by which he feeds his family
and provides for their security. It bears upon his personal well-
being, his mental and physical health.
In days gone by, a man's occupation literally gave him his
name. Even today, continuous and secure employment con-
tributes to a sense of identity for most people.
It is no solace to a man fired from his job that his union
acted without spite, animosity, ill will, and hostility toward
him. If he has been wrongfully discharged by his employer, in
violation of his contract of employment, a collective bargaining
agreement made for his benefit and protection, it is unthinkable
that he should be denied relief-denied justice-by the
courts. 126
The need to recognize the significant personal importance of em-
ployment is especially acute in a union shop for two reasons.
First, employees have specific expectations with regard to contract
administration because such expectations are rooted in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 27 For example, the employees know
that the union and employer have agreed to a four-step grievance
procedure and they expect that it will be correctly followed if a
discharge occurs. Second, by negotiating for exclusive control
over the grievance procedure, the union effectively preempts the
employee from personally presenting his grievance to the em-
ployer.'2 8 As one observer concluded, "Having commandeered
control over the employee's rights under the contract, the union
should owe at least the duty to use reasonable care in enforcing
125. Compare T. BoYcE, supra note 7, at 42 with notes 42-47 supra and accompanying
text.
126. Lowe v. Hotel & Rest. Emp. Union Local 705, 389 Mich. 123, 148, 205 N.W.2d
167, 178-79 (1973).
127. See notes 42-47 supra and accompanying text.
128. Summers, supra note 42, at 278.
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those rights."'12 9
Employees, then, legitimately expect the exercise of reasonable
care in the handling of grievances, but they are occasionally disap-
pointed. They are often further disappointed by courts which
deny them a cause of action against their union or employer be-
cause of a rule of judicial convenience. For example, in Coe v.
United Rubber Workers, 30 the union notified the employer of its
desire to go to arbitration on behalf of a discharged employee.'
3 1
The notification was in writing, as required by the contract, but it
referred to the employee's grievance by an incorrect number.'
32
After the time limit for filing a written grievance had passed, the
union filed its demand for arbitration, this time with the proper
number. 33 The employer denied the claim as untimely, and thus
non-arbitrable.'34 Consequently, the employee sued his employer
and union in federal court. Finding that the union's conduct
could be classified as only "careless" and therefore not within the
Vaca standard of "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith," 
131
the court granted the union's motion for summary judgment. 36
Thus, the employee's claim against his employer failed before it
could be proved.
Another case, Dente v. International Organization of Masters,
Local 90,' 37 also involved a discharged employee as plaintiff, but
one whose grievance had been arbitrated.138 The arbitration re-
sulted in reinstatement but without back pay for the ten-month
lag between the filing of his grievance and its arbitration. 39 The
union was held not to have breached its duty of fair representation
by its delay because "[t]he worst that can be said of [its] conduct is
that it was negligent, and this of course is not enough. ' '" 4" Nota-
bly, even if the court decided that as a matter of law mere negli-
gence could constitute a breach, the facts in Dente might have
indicated that the union's conduct was reasonable since it was ne-
129. Id
130. 571 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1978).
131. Id at 1350.
132. Id
133. Id
134. Id
135. Id at 1350-51.
136. Id at 1350.
137. 492 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974).
138. Id at 11.
139. Id
140. Id at 12.
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gotiating a contract during that time period, 4' and might not have
had sufficient resources to arbitrate in a more timely fashion.
Notwithstanding this circumstance, by not articulating its views of
the facts and the propriety of the standard of liability, the court
found an unwarranted easy answer to an otherwise complicated
question of significant importance to the plaintiff-employee.
B. Non-Adherence to the Guidelines
Because there is minimal need to avoid conflicting rules of
substantive law in fair representation cases, the NLRB and the
courts have traditionally shared jurisdiction in this area of labor
relations.142 Conflicting rules, however, have caused an increase
in the number of charges filed with the Board against unions,
143
including charges "based on little more than the fact that the em-
ployee feels he/she [sic] has been treated 'unfairly'."' 144 Since
each charge must be investigated and analyzed by a field attorney
of the Regional Office, the resulting strain on the financial re-
sources of the NLRB has been considerable. 45
To reduce this growing burden, Irving hoped to persuade all
"interested parties," including the courts, that his guidelines
should be adopted because they represented the best possible solu-
tion in light of various policy considerations. 46 If certainty in the
law could be established, Irving reasoned, potential claimants
would be adequately warned that neither the Board nor the courts
would entertain a claim of unfair representation on the theory of
union negligence.' 47
Because of the absence of workable definitions for the terms
gross and mere negligence and a sound analytical framework in
which to place them, courts may not adopt Irving's guidelines. 48
Instead, courts may continue to apply varying conceptions of a
union's duty of fair representation which may be inconsistent with
141. Id at 11.
142. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 180-81. The need to avoid conflicting rules of substan-
tive law is minimal compared with the need for an alternate forum to protect the individual
employee's interests from potential abuse. See notes 1-7 supra and accompanying text.
143. A direct consequence of confusion in the law is an increase in the number of
unfair representation charges filed with the Regional Offices. Irving speech, supra note 18,
at 228.
144. Union's Duty of Fair Representation, supra note 10, at 225.
145. Id
146. See id at 227-28; Irving speech, supra note 18, at 230.
147. Irving speech, supra note 18, at 231.
148. See notes 115-25 supra and accompanying text.
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the General Counsel's position. 149 Consequently, potential claim-
ants who see no chance of having a complaint issued by the Re-
gional Office may turn to the courts for relief. While this would
decrease the case load of the Board, it would swell the courts'
dockets, and thus the "system" would suffer from the impact of
conflicting rules of law.
"Gross negligence" and "mere negligence" are labels applied
to union behavior without analysis. 5° Discharged employees
with legitimate claims against their employers may be denied their
day in court because their union has been merely negligent.'5 ' Al-
though the memorandum's guidelines do not facilitate a better un-
derstanding of the terms, an alternative view exists which provides
a sound, equitable, and analytical framework within which to
judge union negligence.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
A more reasoned approach to the issue of negligent union ac-
tivity as a breach of its duty of fair representation would be to
eschew the gross negligence-mere negligence distinction which
appears to be the source of most of the problems. A better course
would be to divide union functions relating to the grievance proc-
ess into procedural and substantive tasks.'52 Procedural functions,
for example, would include filing, numbering grievances, and no-
tifying employees of any action taken if such notification is specif-
ically required by the grievance procedure. 53  Under this
alternative approach, if a union were negligent in performing any
of these "procedural" tasks, it would be held to have breached its
149. Cf. notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text. Since lower courts did not uni-
formly adopt the arbitrary element of the Vaca standard, an element which was clearly
expressed, they arguably will not follow guidelines which are relatively unclear.
150. See notes 115-25 supra and accompanying text.
151. See notes 126-41 supra and accompanying text.
152. This Note advocates and develops an alternative view which has been merely sug-
gested by other commentators. See T. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 47-48; Note, supra note 122,
at 178; 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1062, 1067 (1976).
Other solutions have been proposed as well. One observer has advanced a test of in-
trinsic fairness for settling fair representation claims which would emphasize the processing
of all meritorious grievances. Note, supra note 35, at 1225. Similarly, another observer has
suggested a revitalization of the duty by the replacement of the bad faith standard with an
objective review by the courts of any unsatisfied claims. Note, IndividualActionsfor Breach
0/a Collective Bargaining Agreement: Judicial41ternatives to the Grievance Procedure, 1978
WASH. U.L.Q. 765, 791.
153. T. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 48; Note, supra note 124, at 178; 44 FoRDHAM L. Rv.
1062, 1067 (1976).
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duty of fair representation.'54 Notably, since these procedural
tasks do not involve any discretionary decisionmaking, the union's
effectiveness would be undisturbed. 15
5
On the other hand, discretionary or "substantive" deci-
sions-such as whether to grieve on behalf of an employee or
whether to pursue a grievance to arbitration-would not be sub-
ject to a due care requirement and accordingly the issue of union
negligence would be irrelevant. 5 6 Instead, the Vaca standard of
"arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith" would be applied to
determine if the union had breached its duty of fair representa-
tion.' 57 This approach would preserve the union's effectiveness,
insulating its discretionary decisions by resort to a more deferen-
tial standard of review. 158
The due care standard, as applied to a union's procedural non-
discretionary functions, would not require specific or uniform
conduct by a union representative in the performance of any par-
ticular function.'59  Grievance procedures vary,160 personalities
differ, and labor conditions fluctuate. From the flux, however, a
reasonable person standard emerges as the solution: a union
representative must act as a reasonable person would under the
circumstances.161  Significantly, the reasonable person standard
should not be construed as a reasonable expert standard, even
though a steward might gain a considerable amount of experi-
ence.' 62 The steward is not usually an expert claims adjuster with
special skill; rather, he or she is ordinarily elected by co-workers
154. T. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 48; Note, supra note 124, at 178; 44 FoRDHAM L. Rv.
1062, 1067 (1976).
155. T. BoYcE, supra note 7, at 48; 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1062, 1067 (1976). See notes
42-47 supra and accompanying text.
156. See T. BoYcE, supra note 7, at 47; 44 FoRDAm L. REV. 1062, 1067 (1976).
157. T. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 47.
158. Id
159. As Prosser noted: "The utmost that can be done is to devise something in the
nature of a formula, the application of which in each particular case must be left to the
jury, or to the court." W. PROSSER, supra note 115, at 150.
160. Some 99% of all sample contracts in a recent survey included grievance proce-
dures. BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS (BNA) 11 (9th ed. 1979). While the
number of steps in a grievance procedure varies between one and six, the three-step proce-
dure is most common. [1978] 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS AND CON-
TRACTS (BNA) 51:61. As a first step, most grievance procedures call for a discussion
between the employee or employees concerned and the immediate supervisor, any subse-
quent steps are designed to provide for appeal to higher levels of management. Id
161. SeeW. PROSSER, supra note 115, at 151.
162. This is a policy decision rather than a decision based on substantive tort law. See
text accompanying notes 163-65 infra See generally, W. PROSSER, supra note 115, at
161-66.
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because of popularity, not because of skill in contract administra-
tion. 163 Furthermore, leaving the reasonable person standard in-
tact would partially shield union coffers from continual claims
against them 164 and would allow the union to recruit stewards
more easily, Ze., without requiring extensive administrative skill
or training. 165
The wisdom of safeguarding the grievance procedure per se by
applying a due care standard to a union's procedural functions is
supported by two separate concepts-the general nature of the
collective bargaining process and an area of administrative law
undergoing a similar development, the nondelegation doctrine. 6
6
Both emphasize careful safeguarding of "procedure" to ensure a
sound substantive result.
The National Labor Relations Act 167 provides the "bare legal
framework" for collective bargaining between employers and un-
ions.168 The framework consists primarily of two duties-the duty
of an employer not to interfere with his or her employees' choice
of self-organization'69 and the duty to recognize and bargain with
a representative selected by the majority of employees. 170 Com-
pliance with these duties allows the parties to exercise their auton-
omy171 in the negotiation of "rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment"'172 without gov-
ernmental supervision. 173 Autonomy in the bargaining process is
not only desirable, it is necessary:
The whole matter of bargaining and administering a collective
agreement is hard to cover in advance by rules of law. In our
system the parties themselves set the pace. The legislatures, ad-
163. Vladeck, supra note 74, at 45.
164. A "reasonable expert standard" would probably be difficult to apply since not all
experienced or inexperienced stewards possess the special skill required of an expert. Id at
45. One commentator observed, "The level of literacy of the shop steward is often not
adequate for making a sharply defined claim." Id Under these circumstances, more
claims against the union would probably be settled in the employees' favor. Imposing a
reasonable standard of care would avoid this potential problem.
165. Union's Duty of Fair Representation, supra note 10, at 225.
166. The doctrine dictates that a legislature cannot delegate its lawmaking power to
another body. See notes 181-86 infra and accompanying text.
167. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
168. Shulman, supra note 29, at 1000.
169. NLRA § 8(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
170. Id § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
171. Shulman, supra note 29, at 1000.
172. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
173. S. REP. No. 573,74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935), reprinted in STATUTORY HIsToRY
OF THE UNITED STATES LABOR ORGANIZATION 280, 293 (R. Koretz ed. 1970).
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ministrative boards and the courts follow the lead, interfering
to set the rules only after the parties have become obstreperous.
This is essentially a laissezfaire philosophy, where the parties
are expected to create the pattern for themselves.174
Thus, the foundation of our national labor policy requires mini-
mal procedural compliance, founded on the belief that the parties
will consequently produce a contract.
Amendments to the NLRA have built upon its foundation but
have not changed its basic framework. For example, section
8(d) 175 requires good faith bargaining with respect to certain
mandatory bargaining subjects--"wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment."' 176 Nonetheless, the obligation to
bargain in good faith "does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession."' 177 In NLRB v.
Insurance Agents' International Union,178 the Supreme Court
agreed: "But apart from [the duty to bargain in good faith], Con-
gress intended that the parties should have wide latitude in their
negotiations, unrestricted by any governmental power to regulate
the substantive solution of their differences."' 179
Thus, the general nature of collective bargaining allows both
the union and the employer substantive leeway in producing a
collective bargaining agreement, provided that the parties have
complied with the procedural duty to bargain in good faith about
mandatory matters. Similarly, the alternative approach to union
negligence as a breach of the duty of fair representation would
allow the union leeway in certain substantive discretionary mat-
ters18 0 if procedural functions related to grievance processing have
been reasonably performed.
The doctrine of nondelegation, as modified by Professor Da-
vis, also provides analogous support to this alternative approach.
Originally, the nondelegation doctrine was based on the belief
that a legislature could not delegate its lawmaking power to an
174. Gregory, The Collective BargainingAgreement: Its Nature and Scope, 1949 WASH.
U.L.Q. 3, 22.
175. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
176. Id "Wages", for example, includes pensions, fringe benefits, and stock purchases
at less than market price. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LABOR LAW 477 (8th ed. 1977). "Conditions of employment" may include subcontracting,
shift schedules, and technological change. Id Other mandatory subjects include work
rules and matters of union status. Id
177. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
178. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
179. Id at 488.
180. See text accompanying note 156 supra.
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administrative agency. 81 Alternatively, the doctrine was said to
permit delegation only if meaningful statutory standards existed
to guide the exercise of the delegated power.' 82 However, since
the Supreme Court has upheld delegation without meaningful
statutory standards,'83 the doctrine, in Davis' opinion, has failed
to provide adequate standards by which legislative delegation
should be reviewed.' 84 Professor Davis maintains that the doc-
trine's failure is easily explained: "The kind of government we
have compels delegation. The problems of policy, even of major
policy, are so extensive that the 535 people in Congress could not
conceivably decide them or even write meaningful standards to
guide their determination."''8 5
Nonetheless, the basic purpose behind the doctrine remains
compelling-administrative agencies should be prevented from
exercising "unguided and uncontrolled discretion to govern as
they see fit."' 8 6 Accordingly, Professor Davis has suggested a new
nondelegation doctrine which would emphasize procedural safe-
guards to "protect private parties against injustice on account of
unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power."'8 7 To this
end, courts should examine both statutory standards and procedu-
ral safeguards to determine if there is adequate protection against
the exercise of arbitrary power.'t8  For example, if an
administrator, in exercising discretionary power without hearings,
uses a system of "open findings, open reasons, and open prece-
dents," the risk of an arbitrary result is low.' 89 A decision made
181. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 150 (2d ed. 1978). See, e.g., United
States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932) ("That the legislative
power of Congress cannot be delegated is, of course, clear.").
182. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 181, at 151.
183. The Court has approved legislation with remarkedly vague standards for agency
action. Among these standards, the Court has affirmed legislation which allowed agency
action based on: its "own judgment," FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 96
(1953); "public convenience, interest, or necessity," Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros.
Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933); "just and reasonable" actions, Tagg Bros.
& Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 435 n.3 (1930); "public interest," Avent v.
United States, 266 U.S. 127, 130 (1924).
184. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 181, at 151.
185. Id at 150, 152.
186. Id at 206.
187. Id at 208. Another observer supports Davis' conclusion: "The contemporary ap-
proach is one of not invalidating even the broadest statutory delegations of power, but of
assuring that they are accompanied by adequate controls on subsequent administrative
behavior." Leventhal, Principled Fairness and Regulatory Urgency, 25 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 66, 70 (1974).
188. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 181, at 209.
189. Id
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under this procedure should not receive the intense judicial scru-
tiny which would be necessary if the administrator had not stated
reasons or used precedents. 190
Because the new nondelegation doctrine recognizes that proce-
dural safeguards contribute to the prevention of arbitrary admin-
istrative action, it corroborates the emphasis of the alternative
approach on the grievance procedure in order to prevent arbitrary
and negligent union conduct. While Davis' approach requires
"open findings, open reasons, and open precedents," the alterna-
tive view requires a union to perform its procedural grievance-
related functions with reasonable care. In both instances, the re-
sult of the process merits relatively deferential judicial review be-
cause uncontrolled discretion has been prevented. Furthermore,
discretion has been controlled without undermining the union's
effectiveness as exclusive representative. In fact, if a union's pro-
cedural functions have been reasonably performed, it will be al-
lowed to exercise its discretion more freely in substantive
matters.191
The alternative approach to union negligence also avoids the
problems which the Irving guidelines perpetuate.' 92 By substitut-
ing a clear and workable definition of union negligence for "gross
negligence" and "mere negligence," the courts can avoid semantic
issues which often unfairly redound to the union's favor.'93 Con-
sequently, the significant personal interest in employment is rec-
ognized and safeguarded if a union acts negligently while
performing one of its procedural functions. Concomitantly, the
union's ability to make discretionary decisions in matters of con-
tract administration is protected and its position as exclusive rep-
resentative is secured. 19 4
If adopted by both the NLRB and the courts, the alternative
approach to union negligence may also lead to a reduction in the
number of unfair representation charges and complaints filed with
the Regional Offices and the courts respectively. Because it would
add certainty to the law, potential claimants and their attorneys
would be on notice that a union is liable only for its negligence
while performing ministerial tasks. Furthermore, discharged em-
ployees would not be forced to bypass the NLRB procedures to
190. Id at 210.
191. See text accompanying notes 154-56 supra.
192. See text accompanying notes 108-51 supra.
193. See text accompanying notes 120-25 supra.
194. See notes 156-58 supra and accompanying text.
1980]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
find a more favorable and expensive forum for the adjudication of
their claims.' 95 The limited resources of the Board would be well
spent once its procedures were engaged, since claimants would
likely bring meritorious charges in view of predictable and relia-
ble standards.
V. CONCLUSION
The alternative approach to union negligence is an optimum
means of accommodating both the union's interest in exercising
maximum discretion in its contract administration activities and
the employee's interest in being treated fairly in accord with his or
her expectations arising from the bargaining agreement. On the
one hand-where a substantive function has been negligently per-
formed-the union will be favored, and on the other hand-in the
case of the union's procedural negligence-the balance will tip in
favor of the employee.
This is more than a Solomonic split of the burden of risk be-
tween employee and union. Labor relations and administrative
law doctrine have given credence to the notion that by preserving
procedural integrity, substantive rights are also preserved. Thus,
under the alternative approach the employee gains more protec-
tion without significant loss of union effectiveness. Moreover, the
alternative approach appears to avoid the semantic analysis and
unfair results produced by the Irving approach. Consequently,
because the alternative approach seems to enhance all interests
relevant to the duty of fair representation by presenting a clear,
reliable framework, both the NLRB and the courts should con-
sider adopting it as the rule of decision.
RITA A. BARTNIK
195. An employee claiming unfair representation may file a charge with the Regional
Office within six months after the occurrence of the alleged unfair labor practice. NLRA
§ 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976). If the employee fies a charge within this time, the
Regional Office will investigate and prosecute if necessary, thus saving the individual
claimant considerable expense.
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